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Picture a scene in which two people talk to each other about something, anything. Add a
caption to this picture, to the effect of ‘Person A explains X to person B’. Add whatever
touches might be needed to make the scene convey notions of benefaction, supportiveness,
generosity, charity, gift-giving, solidarity—as in the style of paintings which represent
Christian virtues through the depiction of biblical events. What might be said about this
scene? It could be said to symbolise—or caricature—a certain idea of education: of what
education is or ought to be like. Education can sometimes be spoken of as a kind of gift, in
which knowledge is given by one and received by another. It is not so much what is given
that is important, but what it can symbolise: self-realisation, empowerment, autonomy,
security. Education is thus a prominent concern of many philanthropists and overseas
development agencies. Public funding for universal education is also often treated as one of
the benefits, and characteristics, of democratic states. This vision of education resonates
with some psychologically oriented accounts of learning: the argument that learning
happens in a zone of proximal development separating a learner from a more capable other
figures the latter as a benevolent guide to the former, and the relationship between the two
as progressive, centred around the learner’s developmental needs—starting from where the
learner is ‘at’, cognitively.
A contrasting image of education emerges from some more sociologically grounded
accounts, in which learning is figured as a process of disciplining the soul, and constitutive
of a classed habitus. In this scene, the gift of education is not ‘free’: it forces injurious
social norms onto the recipient of knowledge, hidden beneath a guise of welfare, and as a
condition of identity. Education here appears as a successful mechanism of social repro-
duction, where the knowledge gained by individuals is matched to their social destinies—
where they are ‘at’, sociologically and historically. Poor people learn ways of knowing
appropriate to being poor, rich people learn ways of knowing appropriate to being rich, and
neither group knows this (more precisely, the latter deny this). Such accounts explain the
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failures of education to achieve benevolent exchange. Some may go on to recommend that
knowledge be re-distributed more justly, or that what is taught relates more closely to—and
thus validates—the experiences, circumstances and culture of the poor.
Bingham and Biesta’s book could be read as an endeavour to articulate an argument for,
and about, education which deviates from each of these traditions. This ambition is par-
ticularly salient in Chap. 5, on recognition theory. The authors begin this chapter by stating
that education is normally seen as an area of work informed by other disciplines, notably
psychology and sociology. In contrast, they aim to explore the implications of treating a
discipline—here, political philosophy—as an educational practice: a form of teaching, and
a means of making learning/not learning visible. The move here then is to treat education
as a way of constructing an object, to see it in a particular way, rather than as a particular
object of study, such as what goes on in schools and universities. Bingham and Biesta
demonstrate this move in their analysis of the work of Frasier and Honneth. Although
Fraser and Honneth argue with each other about how political forms of recognition take
place, each constructs their argument, poetically, as a form of expert teaching. Fraser
justifies her work in the name of turning ‘folk theories’ into an explicit system of categories
(i.e. ‘real theories’); the assumption this reveals is that it is because people do not know the
logic of their actions that such logic needs to be explained to them by someone who does,
to enable political action by such people. The continuity between Fraser and Honneth is
that the latter also knows what others need to know in order to free themselves from their
own limited view on the world: ‘‘Honneth aims to teach political subjects a political
Esperanto that will enable them to understand their own feelings of disrespect as feelings
that are typical to other members of the entire group of subjects who have such feelings’’
(p. 103). In other words, Honneth’s work is the offer of a language of recognition by which
those who do not have fluency in such language can come to articulate their experiences.
Fraser’s and Honneth’s students are those who are unable to carry out political action
because of where they are ‘at’: stuck in the mire of ‘folk theories’ and using individual/
localised, and thus inadequate, terms of description.
Bingham and Biesta stress that this critique is not a matter of accusing Fraser and
Honneth of being ‘out of touch’ with the gritty realities of political conflict; what is at stake
here is not whether these two academics have lost themselves in sterile theoretical debate
and strayed too far from the empirical concerns of people on the ground. Rather, the issue
is how disciplinary speech, including the speech of Philosophy, positions itself with respect
to the speech of its object of study. The distinction between ‘folk theory’ and disciplinary
theory, or between individual utterances and a ‘grammar of social conflict’ (Honneth,
quoted p. 103), constructs the latter as more developed, systematic, explicit versions of the
former. The difference then between the speech of science and the speech of its objects is
not a matter of different genres, but of a more ‘developed’ genre, which can assist the
objects of science to develop their own understanding. In effect, Fraser and Honneth
construct their work as ‘more capable’ speech which enables learners traverse a zone of
proximal development, to see things more scientifically and thereby to become more
effective political actors. This ‘more capable’ speech is offered to help political actors/
learners develop their capacities. The practice of offering such help, however, constructs
the speech of the objects of science as inherently unscientific; inherently incapable of
political action without the assistance of experts. Experts in what? Precisely in other
people’s incapacities. In other words, it is the very classification of theories as ‘folk’ or as




The Problem with Explanations
Bingham and Biesta’s point here is to show how (mis)recognition theory, and by extension
much academic/disciplinary research on the social order more generally, emerges as
pedagogy: how it constitutes itself as a form of teaching, which constructs the ignorance of
its object in order to offer itself as ignorance’s remedy, or ignorance’s other—i.e.
knowledge.
The move to treat disciplinary discourse as pedagogy responds to Rancie`re’s portrayal
of the principle of explanation, succinctly presented as the first chapter of the book, in a
new essay by Rancie`re. The principle of explanation is Rancie`re’s account of the rela-
tionship between equality and inequality, one which the school institutionalises. In the
essay for this book, Rancie`re revisits the argument developed in The Ignorant School-
master: five lessons in intellectual emancipation (1987/1991), which tells the quixotic
adventures of Joseph Jacotot, a nineteenth century French teacher and revolutionary, whose
pedagogic experiments lead him to conclude that one does not need to know something in
order to teach it. This is because teaching, as all good, progressive teachers know, is not
about transmitting knowledge, but enabling another to learn. However, the school, with its
ordered, hierarchically organised curriculum and its expert teachers, institutionalises the
assumption that this ‘enabling’ is achieved through explanation: ‘‘To explain is to arrange
the elements of knowledge to be transmitted in accordance with the supposed limited
capacities of those under instruction’’ (Rancie`re, p. 3)—in other words, starting from where
students are supposedly ‘at’ and explaining to them what intellectual progress consists of.
The problem which Rancie`re identifies is that explanations institute a principle of infinite
regress: there is always more to be explained. Explanations themselves need explaining. So
how is this regression stopped? By the teacher stating when a certain point has been
reached. What then do explanations achieve? Although justified in terms of closing the gap
between the teacher’s and the student’s learning, they effectively—in practice—perpetu-
ally defer the very distance they are supposed to close: ‘‘if explanation is in principle
infinite, it is because its primary function is to infinitise the very distance it proposes to
reduce’’ (Rancie`re, p. 3).
When Rancie`re states that the problem with ‘explanation’ is not whether it is an
effective method of instruction or not, but instead a matter of politics, he establishes a
continuity between the explanations offered to students to enable them to learn, and the
explanations offered to those deemed unequal to enable them become equal. This conti-
nuity is visible in the school itself, when schooling is treated as a solution to the problem of
social inequality (such ‘treatment’ being always at work in the justification for a public
education system). Such a solution makes inequality visible in a particular way: inequality
becomes a problem of the distribution of knowledge, an ‘explanation’ which makes the
social order a reflection of the ordering of intellectual capacity. Of course, this was pre-
cisely, perversely, Bourdieu’s conclusion: people in specific sociological locations have
specific ways of thinking/being/learning, a move which condemns inequality whilst
making it appear real, ‘empirical’. Rancie`re’s argument with Bourdieu, rehearsed briefly
here again, is that it is the attribution to education of a fantastic power of realising social
equality which makes inequality ‘understandable’; which ‘explains’ inequality, repre-
senting it as a developmental delay or difference. The school does not merely offer
explanations to its students therefore: as an institution, it also models explanation as a way
of making inequality apparent: ‘‘Scholarly progression is the art of limiting the trans-
mission of knowledge, or organising delay, or deferring equality. The pedagogical para-
digm of the master explicator, adapted to the level and needs of students, provides a model
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of the scholarly institution’s social function, which itself translates to a general model of a
society ordered by progress’’ (Rancie`re, p. 8).
Why Write a Book on Rancie`re and Education
Since Rancie`re’s writing on pedagogy is a demolition of the conceit of explanation/
inequality, Bingham and Biesta are at pains to present the book as an intervention on,
rather than an introduction to, his work. The book is not therefore organised to isolate,
define and evaluate a panoply of Rancie`rian concepts for the benefit of a hypothesised
nervous newcomer unable to formulate a response to the original source text. It does not
extend an offer of help to any who might not ‘understand’ Rancie`re, a move which would
have erected a distinction between ‘understanding’ and (merely) ‘interpreting’. To practice
what they preach, and demonstrate how preaching works as practice, the chapters are
written as an encounter between Rancie`re’s writing and arguments familiar in education.
Chapter 3, on the figure of the child in the work of Freire and Rancie`re, is exemplary of
this tactic. The difference between these two writers is established in terms of what a
child’s speech means. In Freire, the child’s speech is treated either as a symptom of
oppression, or as the practice of an emancipated person. Most of the time, of course, it is
the former, a diagnosis which calls forth the emancipated teacher who works with the
child, using particular pedagogic methods, so that the child can become free of domination.
The argument then is that there is a particular technique or method by which the speech of
the child is transformed from symptom to meaning. This argument makes the child’s
speech appear, in the first instance, as false, unreliable, incapable of real meaning; and
meaning-full only as a consequence of dependence on the emancipated teacher. Although
Freire’s technique is meant to ‘help’ the emancipated then, it is based on a primary
disqualification or delegitimisation of their speech. The child’s speech is thereby split into
two kinds: noise, and meaning, a split from which the pedagogy of the oppressed is born.
This critique of critical pedagogy is not new. What Bingham and Biesta add to it is a
comparison between the psychological figure of the child in Freire’s writing, in contrast to
the child as political figure in Rancie`re’s work. Bingham and Biesta tease out the impli-
cations of the justification for universal teaching, given in The Ignorant Schoolmaster,
which is that ‘‘the ‘most difficult’ apprenticeship of all happens to be learning one’s mother
tongue’’ (p. 57): it is by seeing that anybody learns to speak without being taught that
Jacotot/Rancie`re verify equality. Learning to speak then is not a sign of psychological
development, but the very demonstration of political capacity: the capacity to learn
something without being taught. Bingham and Biesta here frame Rancie`re as a kind of
‘empirical philosopher’ (I take the term from Mol 2002), whose arguments invite verifi-
cation through observation. Indeed the chapter includes descriptions of a child learning to
speak. ‘Empirical philosophy’, if one can hold those terms together, is very different from
what might count as empiricism, for instance, testing a hypothesis through neutral
observation. The aim is not to test a claim, but to describe what one can see as a result of an
assumption: here, the assumption of equality in/through speech. Equality then becomes
performative: it is instantiated in the account generated from an initial opinion. If equality
is a matter of performativity, rather than method, it follows that no (pedagogic) method
leads to equality or emancipation; rather, it is a point one starts from and then verifies, by
hearing, feeling, seeing the world in the light of a claim. What Freire sees in a child
learning to speak is someone who cannot yet speak authentically, who is internalising
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oppression. What Bingham and Biesta see through their reading of Rancie`re is a child
taking its first steps as a political agent, who makes sense of the world by acting within it.
In treating the image of a child learning to speak as a verification of equality, Bingham
and Biesta ‘ignore’ the way in which representations of the family have changed since
Jacotot’s time (since the nineteenth century, childhood and the family have also been
represented as institutions, just like the school, with their own distinctive explanatory
techniques), as well as certain tensions within The Ignorant Schoolmaster and between this
book and others by Rancie`re. It is one of the problems of writing a book on someone’s
work that one treats that work as a broadly unified body, rather than a series of narratives.
And it is this treatment which raises questions which might not arise from reading Ran-
cie`re’s books individually. The portrayal of learning to speak as a political act seems to sit
uneasily with the depiction of politics as a ‘rare’ and ‘occasional’ (p. 37) event which
reconfigures the police order, Rancie`re’s term (i.e. not Jacotot’s) for an existing order of
categorisation by which a world is perceived, or appears sensible. Also, if such is politics,
in what sense can it be the basis for educational practice? And if the problem with Freire is
the distinction he establishes between emancipated and non-emancipated speech, what then
to make of the distinction Rancie`re draws up between police and politics? The police/
politics distinction serves a specific purpose in Rancie`re’s books that use it; in writing
about Rancie`re’s work, however, it appears in new places, and can seem rather incon-
gruous as a consequence. Is that a defect of Rancie`re’s work? It depends whether one
thinks it ought to be a unified theory, philosophy, or even practice, an ‘ought’ which
usually accompanies the curricularisation of someone’s writings. Rancie`re is quoted in this
book as saying that theory is what he tries to avoid. But when Bingham and Biesta refer to
the child as ‘a political being’ (p. 72) and then comment on the rarity of politics as event
and as an instance of subjectification, terms such as politics/political become very fluid,
more so than in specific books by Rancie`re. The issue here is not that Bingham and Biesta
should/could have used terms more precisely. Instead, their book raises questions about
how to write an intervention on writings which are themselves interventions on specific
concerns, rather than a theory of something. (I’m reminded here of a talk by Zizek in which
he said, in reply to a question about contradictions across his body of work, that he only
ever wrote a book to try and correct the manifest failure of the previous one—a publishing
strategy usually ignored in books on the topic ‘Zizek’).
A related question is how far, in writing about Rancie`re, one can or should ignore him
and his work. Might there be virtue in this? In their conclusion, Bingham and Biesta quote
from a critical review of Rancie`re’s work which identifies the inadequacies of The Ignorant
Schoolmaster. They then state: ‘‘While it is possible to argue against these matters, point
by point, and thus to explain why this review is wrong, such an explanation is absolutely
incommensurable with the intervention on Rancie`re’s work that we have proposed in this
book’’ (p. 147). One could say, here, that it is the very claim to refuse an explanation which
functions as an explanation of why the review is wrong. In other words, it is the refusal to
explain it which marks the review as incorrect/false, rather than as an arguable interpre-
tation. Bingham and Biesta go on: ‘‘Instead of arguing with this review, let it stand as an
example of what not to do with Rancie`re’s work’’. The invitation to treat the review ‘‘as an
example of what not to do with Rancie`re’s work’’ implies that there are other examples of
‘what to do with Rancie`re’s work’, an implication which, I think, works as explanation.
Am I identifying a problem, a ‘limitation’, with Bingham and Biesta’s argument here? No
and yes. No, in that the book does demonstrate the contradictions in explaining Rancie`re,
in ‘taking him to school’, as they say later in the conclusion; and it is because of this that
the critical review they cite ‘clearly’ misses the point of The Ignorant Schoolmaster.
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Yes, in that the contrast, or opposition, delineated in The Ignorant Schoolmaster between
explanation and interpretation does not, I think, always work quite as clearly elsewhere (or
indeed, in the book itself). The dividing line between explanation and interpretation is also
a matter of sensibility, rather than prior to a distribution of the sensible. What Bingham and
Biesta’s conclusion stages, I think, is the difficulty of distinguishing between better and
worse ways of interpreting Rancie`re (and by extension, the world) whilst claiming that all
intelligences are equal. This difficulty is not a ‘limitation’ of Rancie`re’s work; it is the
dynamic which makes equality unpredictable, an experiment in seeing the world, rather
than a settled state. It is the same difficulty as makes emancipatory teaching and learning
difficult.
Why Education Must Not Be Inclusive
This ‘difficulty’—dissensus, I would call it, after reading Bingham and Biesta’s book—is
one which education research works hard to ignore. This is brilliantly shown in Chapter 4,
in which Bingham and Biesta explore the assumption that education should be both
inclusive and democratic. They identify the two models of democracy on which much
current work on inclusion draws: aggregative and deliberative. The aggregative model
treats democracy as a competition between interests and preferences; this model seems to
be at work in the recent higher education white paper, which states that students’ given
preferences should become more central to the work of democratic/publically-funded
universities. The deliberative model, on the other hand, focuses on the deliberative
transformation of preferences, on identifying which proposals a community agrees are
supported by the best reasons. The deliberative model appears more educative, as it
involves people learning from each other and being attentive to different arguments. This
model is visible in accounts of the education system as central to a democratic state, as it is
where people encounter and learn to respond to otherness and difference reasonably—
through reason. It is also at work in many funding calls for education research concerned
with identifying how the views, experiences and activities of ‘marginalised’ social groups
can become more included in the work of education; for instance, how students identified
as having ‘special educational needs’ can be supported in schools.
Whilst carefully examining the detail of these contrasting traditions, Bingham and
Biesta raise questions about each, and particularly the deliberative model. The issue is who
is included in what and on what terms:
Inclusion appears in this discussion [about deliberative democracy] as a process in
which those who stand outside of the sphere of democracy are brought into this
sphere and, more importantly, are brought into this sphere by those who are already
on the ‘inside’, so to speak. The assumption here is that inclusion is a process which
happens ‘from the inside out’, a process which emanates from the position of those
who are already considered to be democratic. The very language of inclusion not
only suggests that someone is including someone else. It also suggests that someone
is setting the terms for inclusion and that it is for those who wish to be included to
meet those terms (p. 81).
Although democracy is often treated as synonymous with social inclusion, Bingham and
Biesta re-position these terms as opposites. The work of achieving social inclusion—in
education, social services, the voluntary sector, foreign policy very obviously—suddenly
appears as a form of colonialism; an image which opens up the possibility of articulating
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the problem, for instance, with leaving no child behind, or making every child matter,
without simply accusing these efforts of either deceit/lying or operational failure. Bingham
and Biesta here trace a path different from sociological and psychological critiques
concerned with how to include more identities in a democratic education system. This
opens the way for new arguments about how, in teaching and learning, democracy can be
treated both as a starting point and as an ongoing practice with no predictable or finite
outcome.
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